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I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ application of the Alien
Tort Statute (“ATS”) in its recent decision Cardona v. Chiquita Brands
International, Inc. demonstrates a mechanical and restrictive
application of the holding of the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Company.1 The Eleventh Circuit declared that since
none of Chiquita Brands International’s (“Chiquita”) relevant
conduct took place within the United States, U.S. courts lacked the
power to review the claims of over four thousand Colombians who
sought to hold Chiquita liable for the deaths of family members.2
In March 2007, Chiquita, a major U.S. multi-national
corporation, pled guilty to a federal felony of knowingly providing
material support to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”),
a paramilitary terrorist organization notorious for its mass murder
of Colombian civilians.3 Chiquita argued that the AUC extorted its
support as payment for protection, and that Chiquita never received
services in exchange for those payments from the AUC.4 However,
Chiquita “fail[ed] to square its claimed victimhood with the facts.”5
Contrary to Chiquita’s claims that these payments were extorted,
internal company documents published by the National Security
Archive (“NSA”), an independent research group, strongly suggest
that the transactions provided specific benefits to Chiquita.6 By its
1
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1188.
3
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760
F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-14898) (“Chiquita’s assistance to the AUC was a
federal crime because the U.S. Government had officially designated the AUC a
‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ and a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist,’ and thus,
a threat to the security of foreign policy of the United States.”).
4
Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US Banana Firm Hired Colombia Paramilitaries,
ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011
/04/20114813392621189.html; see also Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins
Dismissal of U.S. Suits on Colombia Torture, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 25, 2014, 8:35 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/chiquita-wins-dismissal-of-us-suits-over-colombia-torture-1- (“No executives were charged under the deal, which
was reached when Chiquita was represented by then-Covington & Burling LLP lawyer
Eric Holder, now the U.S. attorney general.”).
5
See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 12, United States v. Chiquita Bananas
Int’l, Inc., No. 07-055 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Chiquita Sentencing Hearing]
(arguing that “[a]s a multi-national corporation, Defendant Chiquita was not forced to
remain in Colombia for 15 years, all while paying the three leading terrorist groups
terrorizing the Colombian people”).
6
Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US Banana Firm Hired Colombia Paramilitaries,
ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011
/04/20114813392621189.html. The documents consist of more than 5,500 pages of
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own account, between 1997 and 2008, Chiquita made over one
hundred payments to the AUC, totaling $1.7 million, in addition to
assisting the AUC in “smuggling arms and ammunition with full
knowledge that the AUC was a violent organization responsible for
crimes against humanity.”7
During this period of support, 3,778 people were murdered in
the Uraba region of Colombia, with an additional sixty thousand
people forced into what is now the second largest internally
displaced population in the world.8 As the Colombian people were
terrorized, from 2001 to 2004, Chiquita turned a $49.4 million
profit from its Colombia operations.9 “The company, having
knowingly and repeatedly approved transactions its own lawyers
were flagging, also went to great lengths to disguise the payments,
using special vocabulary in company accounting records and
various intermediaries on the ground in Colombia”; however, none
of the dozens of high level officials who approved the payments
have been prosecuted, nor have any reparations been paid to the
victims.10 Chiquita executives classified the payments as “the cost
of doing business in Colombia”—a cost that included a shipment
of three thousand AK-47 assault rifles and five million rounds of
ammunition.11 Nevertheless, Chiquita maintains that it only paid
militias to protect employees and that it should not be held
responsible for the tragic violence that plagued Colombia.12
Notwithstanding the corporation’s cursory justifications, Chiquita
aided the AUC because it benefitted from the AUC’s pacification of

internal Chiquita memos which “reinforce the claim . . . that the company was
knowingly complicit in, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC”
while on the Chiquita payroll. Id. (quoting Arturo Carrillo, director of George
Washington University’s International Human Rights Clinic).
7
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 1–2; Chiquita Sentencing Hearing,
supra note 5, at 29 (“What makes this conduct so morally repugnant is that the
company went forward month after month, year after year, to pay the same terrorists.”).
8
Steven Cohen, How Chiquita Bananas Undermined the Global War on Terror, THINK
PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/08/02/346
6915/chiquita-colombia-ruling/.
9
Chiquita Sentencing Hearing, supra note 5, at 13.
10
Id.
11
Associated Press, Chiquita Accused of Funding Colombia Terrorists, CBS NEWS (May
31, 2011, 8:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chiquita-accused-of-fundingcolombia-terrorists/ (“In a 1997 handwritten note, one Chiquita executive said such
payments are the ‘cost of doing business in Colombia.’ ‘Need to keep this very
confidential—people can get killed.’”).
12
Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins Dismissal of U.S. Suits on Colombia
Torture, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 25, 2014, 8:35 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-07-24/chiquita-wins-dismissal-of-u-s-suits-over-colombia-torture-1-.
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the banana-growing regions and the suppression of labor union
activity and other social unrest that could have harmed Chiquita’s
operations.13
This Note argues that the dissent in Cardona was correct in that
Chiquita’s connections to the United States displaced the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Chiquita is incorporated
and headquartered in the United States, and Chiquita’s
participation in reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of
payments and weapons shipments to a Colombian terrorist
organization all took place from its U.S.–based corporate offices.
Part II of this Note will discuss the foundation of ATS litigation,
from the enactment of the 1789 Judiciary Act through the Kiobel
decision. Part III will outline and analyze the growing split amongst
circuit courts regarding their application of Kiobel. Finally, Part IV
will examine Cardona by reconsidering the dissent and exploring the
divergent treatment of corporate liability and aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS. Additionally, Part IV will discuss certain
international and human rights doctrinal debates which are
implicated through ATS litigation.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
granting the national government control over foreign affairs.14
However, the ATS laid dormant and was essentially ignored for over
two centuries, until its revival in 1980 by way of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, as well as the
rapid expansion of the human rights movement in the latetwentieth century.15

13
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 2, 10–13 (stating that through this
strategic alliance, Chiquita was able to eliminate union organizers and others it
perceived as hostile to its interests, and whom the AUC perceived as guerilla
sympathizers, reduce operating costs, and eliminate disruptions and competition).
14
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
15
Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to the ATS as
a “rarely-invoked provision”); see also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.
1975) (calling the ATS “a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since
the first Judiciary Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know whence it
came.”).
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A. Revival of the ATS: Filartiga v. Peña-Irala
Filartiga concerns the 1976 fatal kidnapping and torture of
Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay by Americo Peña-Irala, a Paraguayan
police officer, in retaliation for the human rights advocacy and
political beliefs of Joelito’s father, a Paraguayan physician and
activist.16 Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action in the
Paraguayan courts against Peña-Irala, unaware that he had fled to
the United States.17 Joelito’s sister, who was then living in
Washington, D.C., caused Peña-Irala to be served with a complaint,
which alleged that Peña-Irala had wrongfully caused the death of
her brother by torture.18 The district court dismissed the case,
holding that it was constrained by dicta contained in two recent
opinions that stated that the State’s treatment of its own citizens did
not violate international law.19
The Carter administration filed an amicus brief supporting the
Filartigas’ view that the ATS provided jurisdiction over their claim
because: (1) the ATS incorporates an evolving body of international
law that affords individual rights that can be directly enforced in
domestic courts; (2) the judiciary had the authority to decide the
case despite foreign affairs implications; and (3) litigation in
Paraguay would not be possible.20 Less than a month after the
executive branch filed its brief, the court in Filartiga held that official
torture is unambiguously prohibited by the law of nations, noting
that the ultimate scope of the fundamental rights conferred by
international law “will be subject to continuing refinement.”21
Further, the court held that the ATS affords federal jurisdiction for
adjudication over claims that violate universally accepted norms of
international law.22
B. Cautious Optimism: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
The first judicial response after Filartiga came in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, where the D.C. Circuit Court found that a claim
16

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
Id. at 878–79.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976)); IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).
20
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
21
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the dictum in Dreyfus
v. von Finck relied on by the district court “is clearly out of tune with the current usage
and practice of international law”).
22
Id. at 877.
17
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of ATS jurisdiction based on acts of terrorism—specifically, an
armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel—should be dismissed;
however, the judges disagreed as to the reasoning, as illustrated by
the three separate concurring opinions.23 Judge Edwards largely
adhered to the legal principles established in Filartiga, but found
that factual distinctions precluded a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction, while Judge Robb would have dismissed the case on
political question grounds.24
Judge Bork, however, insisted that the federal courts had no
power to recognize a cause of action for the claims at issue in either
Filartiga or Tel-Oren.25 According to Judge Bork, such a cause of
action would intrude upon the foreign affairs powers of the
executive branch, a result that could not possibly have been what
the drafters of the ATS intended.26 Judge Bork’s critical response to
Filartiga stemmed from a formalist notion of separation of powers
that implicitly rejects the vision of the ATS as a mechanism for
developing international law norms.27
C. Affirmation of Modern ATS Litigation: Sosa v. AlvarezMachain
In 2004, the Supreme Court made its first pronouncement on
the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.28 The Court determined that the
ATS was purely jurisdictional, and “is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide
a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”29
Additionally, the Court held that the jurisdictional grant of the ATS
took effect from the moment of its enactment, as it was not passed
“to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state
legislature.”30
Sosa involved a Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agent who,

23
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Compare
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring), with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823
(Robb, J., concurring).
24
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776, 796.
25
Id. at 798–823 (Bork, J., concurring).
26
Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
27
Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
28
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
29
Id. at 724.
30
Id. at 719 (“The anxieties of the pre-constitutional period cannot be ignored
easily enough to think that the statute was not meant to have a practical effect.”).
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while on assignment in Mexico, was captured, tortured and killed.31
Based on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials believed AlvarezMachain (“Alvarez”), a Mexican physician, was present at the house
to prolong the agent’s life in order to extend the interrogation and
torture.32 When requests for help to the Mexican government
proved fruitless, the DEA successfully executed a plan to hire
Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United
States for trial.33 However, Alvarez returned to Mexico and began a
civil action against Sosa, several DEA agents, several Mexican
civilians, and the United States after the Supreme Court found that
Alvarez’s forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal
court.34
Although the Supreme Court asserted that district courts could
recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the
law of nations, the Court restrained the discretion that district courts
should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind.35
The Supreme Court required “any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms.”36 Offenses of the law
of nations specifically included violations of safe conduct,
infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.37 Therefore,
the Supreme Court reasoned, a single illegal detention of less than
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and
a prompt arraignment, does not fall within the three spheres of
conduct that violate customary international law norms so as to
support the creation of a federal remedy.38
D. Limiting Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
The majority of modern ATS debate stems from the Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company decision, which brought virtually all
pending ATS litigation to a halt.39 The plaintiffs in Kiobel were
31

Id. at 697.
Id.
33
Id. at 698.
34
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
35
Id. at 724.
36
Id. at 725.
37
Id. at 715.
38
Id. at 738.
39
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Rich Samp,
Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the Future of Alien Tort
Litigation, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/
32
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Nigerian nationals who were granted political asylum in the United
States.40 The plaintiffs claimed that Dutch, British, and Nigerian
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.41 More
specifically, the complaint alleged that Nigerian military and police
forces attacked plaintiffs’ villages, beating, raping, killing, and
arresting residents, and destroying or looting property.42 These
vicious attacks suspiciously occurred after plaintiffs began
protesting the environmental effects of Royal Dutch Petroleum’s oil
exploration and production in the region.43 The Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision was fractured by four distinct opinions.44
The majority of the Court, led by Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, held that courts
exercising their power under the ATS are constrained by the
presumption against extraterritorial application.45 The presumption
against extraterritoriality states that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,” and to
rebut the presumption, a statute would need to demonstrate a “clear
indication of extraterritoriality.”46 Although the Court originally
granted certiorari to consider whether the law of nations recognizes
corporate liability, the majority reasoned that the Kiobel plaintiffs’
claims were barred because the events occurred on the soil of a
foreign sovereign state.47 As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged,
the presumption against extraterritoriality is typically used to
discern whether the substantive content of laws applies abroad, in
contrast to the ATS, which is utilized to determine jurisdictional

2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-futureof-alien-tort-litigation/.
40
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63.
41
Id. at 1662–63.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1659.
45
Id. at 1669.
46
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013)
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)); see also EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (This presumption “serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord.”).
47
Id. at 1663 (After oral argument, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing an additional question: “Whether and under what
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States.”).
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issues and does not regulate conduct or afford relief.48
Although the Court in Kiobel found that all the relevant conduct
took place outside the United States, the Court also stated that “even
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against exterritorial application. Corporations are
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say
mere corporate presence suffices.”49
The majority opinion,
however, gave no indication of what may constitute sufficient
contact to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. This
lack of clarity is lamented in the concurring opinions.50
Justice Kennedy’s deciding fifth vote is accompanied by a
concise and explicit opinion, in which he agreed with the Court’s
narrow holding, tailored to the case at hand.51 Nevertheless, Justice
Kennedy also acknowledged that in cases of extraterritorial human
rights abuses committed abroad, where neither the Kiobel holding
nor a statute, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(“TVPA”), are applicable, “proper implementation of the
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some
further elaboration and explanation.”52
Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that causes of action
under the ATS should be barred unless the domestic conduct
violates an international law norm sufficient to meet the Sosa
requirements of definitiveness and acceptance among nations.53
Since none of the acts in Kiobel took place domestically, Justice Alito
would find the claim barred by the presumption against
extraterritoriality.54
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer rejected invoking the
presumption against extraterritoriality because it “rests on the
perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to

48
Id. at 1664; see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to
“Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreignsquared-cases/ (calling the presumption against extraterritoriality an “odd fit” in the
ATS context).
49
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
50
Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority’s narrow approach
leaves much unanswered).
51
Id. at 1669–70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52
Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).
53
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
54
Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.A.
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domestic, not foreign matters.”55 Under Justice Breyer’s test, there
would be jurisdiction under the ATS where: “(1) the alleged tort
occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national,
or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other
common enemy of mankind.”56 Furthermore, Justice Breyer relied
on Sosa to determine the extent to which the courts may allow the
ATS claims of those harmed by activities that take place abroad, and
provided a measure of guidance regarding the majority’s standard.57
While the first prong of Justice Breyer’s test is not controversial,
the second and third prongs present the possibility of divergence
from the majority standard.58 Ultimately, Justice Breyer agreed with
the majority and concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel did
not fall within the jurisdictional purview of the ATS.59 In arriving at
his conclusion, Justice Breyer noted that all parties involved were
U.S. citizens, the conduct occurred abroad, and there was no distinct
U.S. interest present in the case.60
III. KIOBEL AFTERMATH: ANALYSIS OF THE GROWING SPLIT
This part will evaluate the growing split amongst circuit courts
in light of the minimal guidance provided by the Kiobel decision.
Since Kiobel, courts have applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to all ATS litigation. Yet circuit courts have
employed the presumption, and its ancillary touch and concern test,
in both narrow and broad fashions.61 As courts continue to
decipher Kiobel, questions regarding the kinds of allegations that are
sufficient to satisfy the touch and concern requirement, as well as
issues of corporate liability, remain unresolved.62
55
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).
56
Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57
Id. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Congress has not sought to
limit the statute’s jurisdictional or substantive reach in the wake of Sosa).
58
Compare Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669, with Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
59
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring).
60
Id.
61
See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
62
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for
Human Rights Violations, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2013) (“[G]iven the level of public
interest in the case and the extensive briefing, it was a shock that the Kiobel Court was
utterly silent on whether corporations even in principle can have international
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In Kiobel, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, which established the principal that
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.”63 Nonetheless, Kiobel was not a death
sentence for the ATS; it only eliminated the particular kind of ATS
actions discussed in Morrison: “foreign cubed” ATS actions in which
(1) foreign plaintiffs are suing (2) a foreign defendant in an
American court for conduct that took place entirely within (3)
foreign territory.64 Therefore, “foreign squared” cases, where the
plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where the conduct
occurred on U.S. soil may still be “on the table.”65
Chief Justice Roberts appeared to leave the door open for ATS
cases involving U.S. plaintiffs or U.S. defendants abroad, even if
only narrowly, by espousing the touch and concern requirement.66
However, in the entirety of the Kiobel majority opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts referenced the touch and concern requirement exactly once,
leaving many questions as to what specifically the test entails.67
A. Misguided Clarity: Kiobel’s Phantom Bright Line Rule
In Balintulo v. Daimler AG, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that, where plaintiffs have failed to allege that any relevant
conduct occurred in the United States, Kiobel foreclosed the
plaintiffs’ ATS claims.68 In Balintulo, South African victims of
apartheid brought suits against corporate defendants, including
Daimler, Ford, and IBM, for aiding and abetting violations of
customary international law committed by the South African
government.69 The court pointedly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that, although “mere corporate presence” is inadequate to touch and
concern the United States with “sufficient force,” corporate
obligations to respect human rights norms.”).
63
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255).
64
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247, 283 n.11 (emphasis added); see Hathaway, supra note
48.
65
Hathaway, supra note 48.
66
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; Hathaway, supra note 48.
67
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices.”) (internal citations omitted).
68
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013).
69
Id. at 179–80 (Plaintiffs claim that these subsidiary companies sold cars and
computers to the South African government and consequently facilitated the apartheid
regime’s innumerable race-based injustices, rapes, tortures, and extrajudicial killings.).
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citizenship in the United States is satisfactory.70 However, the court
did not address the factual distinctions between corporate
citizenship and mere corporate presence.71 The court reiterated that
the relevant conduct occurred in South Africa, ignoring the touch
and concern element of the majority’s opinion in Kiobel, and
maintaining that the court had “no reason to explore, less explain,
how courts should proceed when some of the relevant conduct
occurs in the United States.”72
The Second Circuit adopted the view expressed by Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Kiobel while at the same time recognizing that a
majority of the Supreme Court did not share this view.73 The Second
Circuit justified the application of Justice Alito’s test by stating that,
while the Supreme Court did not embrace it, “it did not reject it
either; the majority simply left open any questions regarding the
permissible reach of causes of action under the ATS when some
domestic activity is involved in the case.”74 However, the same logic
can be used to apply the views of Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which
would have allowed jurisdiction since the defendant was a US
citizen.75 Curiously, the court in Balintulo cites Kiobel in support of
the Second Circuit’s holding that corporations are not proper
defendants under the ATS when it is unmistakable that the case was
decided on other grounds.76 The court simultaneously denied that
the apartheid victims had alleged any relevant U.S.-based conduct
and ignored allegations that the defendants took affirmative steps
in the United States to circumvent the sanctions regime by
supplying the South African government with their products,
despite legal restrictions against trade with South Africa.77 The
Second Circuit held that this U.S.-based conduct was not tied to the
relevant human rights violations.78

70

Id. at 189–90 (“Accordingly, if all relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is
simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”).
71
Id. at 191.
72
Id. (emphasis added).
73
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191 n.26 (2d Cir. 2013).
74
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding,
Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Kiobel to foreclose
jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was detained
and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi
business partner).
75
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76
Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 n.26.
77
Id. at 192.
78
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit has reached similar conclusions.79 In
Baloco v. Drummond Company, the court concluded that the claimed
violations of the law of nations did not meet the touch and concern
test established by Kiobel and thus did not displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application.80 For this reason, the claims
were dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that Drummond Company,
a closely held corporation with its principal place of business in
Alabama, operated a coal mining operation in Colombia that aided
and abetted or conspired with the AUC by directly funding some of
its operations.81 The plaintiffs also alleged that Drummond
collaborated with the AUC to commit a number of murders.82 Since
these murders occurred in the context of an armed conflict between
the AUC and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(“FARC”), a leftist guerilla organization, the plaintiffs classified the
murders as war crimes.83
The Eleventh Circuit found that, since the extrajudicial killings
and war crimes alleged in the complaint occurred in Colombia, the
conduct was not sufficient to warrant the extraterritorial application
of the ATS, notwithstanding the fact that Drummond was a U.S.
national.84 However, unlike Kiobel, which did not involve a U.S.
corporate national or any defendant conduct that occurred within
the United States, the court in Baloco admitted that “these murders
‘touch and concern the territory of the United States (because of
Drummond’s alleged involvement).”85 Nonetheless, the court ruled
that the “claims are not focused within the United States” and thus
failed to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.86 Furthermore, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request
for remand, which would have allowed the district court to consider
79
See generally Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138887
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a narrow reading of postKiobel ATS jurisdiction that focused primarily on the territorial location of the
allegations).
80
Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2014).
81
Id. at 1233.
82
Id. at 1234.
83
Id. (explaining that the AUC is an organization affiliated with Colombia’s
military and which provided security against guerilla attacks for Drummond’s coal
mining facility and operations).
84
Id. at 1236 (stating that the issue is not whether the murders “touch and
concern” the United States, as plaintiffs suggest, but rather whether the murders “touch
and concern the territory of the United States”) (citing Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669).
85
Id. at 1237–38 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).
86
Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining
that the extraterritoriality inquiry turns on where the transaction that is the focus of the
statute at issue occurred) (emphasis in original).
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the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel.87
B. Touch and Concern as a Fact Based Analysis
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs’ claims, which alleged that a U.S. corporation
tortured and mistreated Iraqi citizens during their detention at the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq as suspected enemy combatants, touched
and concerned the territory of the United States with sufficient force
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of
the ATS.88 Due to a shortage of trained military interrogators, the
United States hired CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (“CACI”), a
corporation domiciled in Virginia, to provide private
interrogators.89
The plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees
instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and
abetted illicit conduct towards the detainees.90 Additionally, the
plaintiffs alleged that CACI’s managers failed to investigate or to
report accusations of wrongdoing and repeatedly denied that any
CACI employees had engaged in abusive conduct.91 The Fourth
Circuit maintained that the clear implication of the Supreme Court’s
language regarding touch and concern is that the court should not
assume that the presumption categorically bars cases that manifest
a close connection to U.S. territory.92 Rather, “a fact-based analysis
is required in such cases to determine whether courts may exercise
jurisdiction over certain ATS claims.”93
In evaluating the touch and concern requirement, the court
evaluated several factors, namely CACI’s permission from the U.S.
government “to conduct interrogations and obtain security
clearances, and allegations that CACI managers in the United States
acquiesced in, or concealed, misconduct.”94 By distinguishing the
attenuated connection to U.S. territory reflected by Kiobel’s facts
87

Id. at 1239.
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014);
Jonathan Stempel, Abu Ghraib Torture Lawsuit Revived by US. Appeals Court, REUTERS
(June 30, 2014, 2:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-abughraibcaci-idUSKBN0F51BK20140630 (“Photos depicting abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees
emerged in 2004. Some detainees claimed they endured physical and sexual abuse,
infliction of electric shocks, and mock executions.”).
89
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520.
90
Id. at 520–22.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 528–29.
93
Id. (considering a broader range of facts than the location where the plaintiffs
actually sustained their injuries).
94
Stempel, supra note 88.
88
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from the allegations of torture committed by U.S. citizens who were
employed by a U.S. corporation in Al Shimari, the court was able to
conclude that these claims surpass the “mere corporate presence”
that was fatal in Kiobel, thus overcoming the presumption of
extraterritoriality.95 The court observed that “mechanically applying
the presumption to bar these ATS claims would not advance the
purposes of the presumption,” since the plaintiffs in Al Shimari
sought to enforce the customary law of nations against torture.96
The court also stated that the case did not present any potential
problems associated with bringing foreign nationals into U.S. courts
to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the defendants
were U.S. citizens.97 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
in Al Shimari employed the touch and concern test “by considering
a broader range of facts than just the location where the plaintiffs
actually sustained their injuries.”98
Most recently, in Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
similarly rejected a blanket ruling against extraterritoriality and
remanded the case for further proceedings in light of Kiobel’s
ambiguous touch and concern standard.99 The plaintiffs were three
victims of child slavery who alleged that Nestlé and other
defendants “aided and abetted child slavery by providing assistance
to Ivorian farmers.”100 The court reasoned that:
[d]espite their knowledge of child slavery and their control over the cocoa
95

Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528.
Id. at 529–30.
97
Id. (“A basic premise of the presumption against extraterritorial application is
that United States courts must be wary of international discord resulting from
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.”) (citing Sexual
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 322–24 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that
Kiobel did not bar ATS claims against an American citizen, in part because “[t]his is not
a case where a foreign national is being hailed into an unfamiliar court to defend
himself”)).
98
Id. at 529. But see Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42,
45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Kiobel to foreclose jurisdiction over ATS claims
filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was detained and tortured by the
Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi business partner).
99
Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Rather than
attempt to apply the amorphous touch and concern test on the record currently before
us, we conclude that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to amend their
complaint in light of Kiobel.”).
100
Id. at 1016–17 (“They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up
to fourteen hours per day six days a week, given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped
and beaten by overseers. They were locked in small rooms at night and not permitted
to leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be beaten
or tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who
attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards forced failed escapees to
drink urine.”).
96
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market, the defendants operate in the Ivory Coast ‘with the unilateral
goal of finding the cheapest sources of cocoa.’ The defendants continue
to supply money, equipment, and training to Ivorian farmers, knowing
that these provisions will facilitate the use of forced child labor.101

The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the court
should apply the Morrison focus test, noting that while the test may
be informative, the Supreme Court in Kiobel did not explicitly adopt
it, instead choosing the touch and concern requirement to articulate
the legal standard.102
IV. REEXAMINATION OF CARDONA
A. Majority Opinion
In Cardona, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on
interlocutory review, determined that the complaints did not state
claims within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.103 The court did not
address the specific questions that were certified for review.104 The
court acknowledged that during the pendency of this appeal, the
Supreme Court had acted with respect to ATS claims.105 Drawing a
parallel between Kiobel and Cardona, the court noted that both cases
involved the commission of tortious actions by a corporation in
conjunction with paramilitary forces within a foreign territory.106 In
reaching its holding, the majority maintained that the distinction
between the corporation in Kiobel, which was merely present in the
United States, and the corporation in Cardona, a U.S. corporation,
did not lead to “any indication of a congressional intent to make
the statute apply to extraterritorial torts. . . . [And,] ‘[i]f Congress
were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS

101
Id. at 1017–18 (noting that defendants have also lobbied against congressional
efforts to curb the use of child slave labor).
102
Id. at 1028 (citing Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2284). The focus test states that a cause
of action falls outside the presumption against extraterritoriality only if the events or
relationships that are the focus of congressional concern in the relevant statute occur
within the United States. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; see Mark J. Mullaney, Ninth Circuit
Allows Child Slaves to Amend Complaint to Satisfy New Kiobel Standard, INT’L RIGHTS
ADVOCATES (Sept. 26, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.iradvocates.org/blog/ninth-circuitallows-child-slaves-amend-complaint-satisfy-new-kiobel-standard (“The court rejected
the Defendants’ calls to directly apply the restrictive Morrison “focus” test, observing
that Kiobel explicitly avoided using the terms of art found in Morrison.”).
103
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1187 (11th Cir. 2014).
104
Id. at 1188 (“Because we conclude that neither this court nor the district court
has jurisdiction over the action, we untimely will not answer those specific
questions . . . .”).
105
Id. at 1189.
106
Id.

STYLIANOU FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

UNPEELING THE GROWING SPLIT

2/5/2016 9:05 PM

235

would be required.’”107 The court flatly concluded that “[t]here is
no other statute. There is no jurisdiction.”108 According to the
majority, Chiquita’s U.S. citizenship was completely irrelevant to
the ATS evaluation.109
The court rationalized its holding by noting the history of the
ATS, specifically Sosa, precluded the court from applying the ATS to
the allegations in Cardona.110 In evaluating the touch and concern
test, the majority stated, “[t]here is no allegation that any torture
occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in
terms of the ATS touched or concerned the territory of the United
States with any force.”111
The majority offered no further
explanation. Consequently, as the murders at the center of the
plaintiffs’ allegations took place in Colombia, the majority chose
not to apply the touch and concern test at all, reflecting the
restrictive version of the test advocated by Justice Alito’s concurrence
in Kiobel.112 However, many have criticized the ruling as impudent
in light of the facts and the infamous legacy of Chiquita’s operations
in developing nations.113 The majority did not address, let alone
consider, the allegations of U.S.-based aiding and abetting, or that
Chiquita’s actions were U.S. crimes under anti-terrorism laws.114
B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Martin, in dissent, argued that the facts of Cardona are
sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality for
two reasons.115 First, the primary defendant was Chiquita Brands
International, a corporation headquartered and incorporated within
the territory of the United States.116 Second, Chiquita “participated
in a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by reviewing,
107
108
109

Id. (quoting Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669).
Id.
See generally Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir.

2014).
110

Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1191.
112
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669–70 (2013) (Alito,
J., concurring).
113
Cohen, supra note 8 (“This opinion is shockingly negligent in terms of just
actually dealing with the facts and dealing with the issues . . . . It’s almost flippant in
terms of just gleefully throwing the case out.”) (quoting Terry Collingsworth, one of
the chief litigators for the Chiquita victims, in an interview with Think Progress).
114
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *14, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760
F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015) (No. 14-777).
115
Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting).
116
Id.
111
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approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons
shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their
corporate offices in the territory of the United States.”117 Chiquita’s
U.S.-based officials took substantial measures to conceal these
payments by issuing checks payable to individual employees who
would endorse the checks, convert them to cash, and then deliver
the funds to the AUC.118 Through this analysis of the touch and
concern test, Judge Martin found that the plaintiffs met the Kiobel
standard.119
The dissent distinguished the facts from Kiobel by noting that
the plaintiffs did not rely on Chiquita’s “mere corporate presence”
to justify ATS jurisdiction, as Chiquita is incorporated in New Jersey
and headquartered in Ohio.120 This was not a case, Judge Martin
stated, where a defendant was being haled into court under the ATS
for actions that took place on foreign soil, or where plaintiffs were
seeking to circumvent the presumption against extraterritoriality by
holding an American company vicariously liable for the
unauthorized action of its subsidiaries overseas.121 Thus, the dissent
concluded that the touch and concern test is satisfied when a
defendant aids and abets overseas torts from within the United
States.122 Judge Martin derided the court’s unwillingness to enforce
the ATS, saying that, by doing so, “we disarm innocents against
American corporations that engage in human rights violations
abroad. I understand the ATS to have been deliberately crafted to
avoid this regrettable result.”123
C. Distinguishing Kiobel from Cardona
Through its mechanical application of Kiobel in Cardona, the
Eleventh Circuit ignored major distinctions between the two

117

Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 114, at *7.
119
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting).
120
Id. at 1192.
121
Id. at 1194.
122
Id. at 1194–95 (Martin, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960
F. Supp. 2d 304, 323–24 (D. Mass. 2013); Mwani v. Laden 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13
(D.D.C. 2013); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395, 2014 WL 1669873, at
*29–30 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
123
Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting); Lauren Carasik, The Uphill
Battle to Hold US Corporations Accountable for Abuses Abroad, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 8,
2014, 6:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/chiquita-corporate
accountabilityunitednationshumanrights.html.
118
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cases.124 In Kiobel, all of the alleged atrocities were committed in
Nigeria, the defendants were Dutch, British, and Nigerian
corporations, and their only relevant connections to the United
States consisted of their corporate listing on the New York Stock
Exchange and their affiliation with a public relations office in New
York.125 “Moreover, none of the defendants had engaged in any
activities in the United States that appeared to be relevant to the
claimed tortious acts that occurred in Nigeria.”126
Thus, the Cardona majority adopted the Second Circuit’s
approach and held that the “ATS contains nothing to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality” and, since the conduct at
issue occurred in Colombia, the ATS was inapplicable.127 Yet the
facts of Kiobel and Cardona are decidedly distinguishable. Unlike the
corporations in Kiobel, Chiquita is incorporated in New Jersey and
headquartered in Ohio. These facts subject Chiquita to U.S.
regulation and make the United States responsible for its acts under
international law.128 The plaintiffs sought to hold Chiquita liable
for conduct that occurred in the United States: in particular, one
hundred separate payments to the AUC that Chiquita reviewed,
approved, and directed at the highest corporate levels from its U.S.
headquarters.129
In contrast to the acts of the corporations in Kiobel, Chiquita
actively participated in a campaign of torture and murder in
Colombia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of
payments and weapons shipments to a Colombian terrorist
organization, all from its corporate offices in the United States.130
At numerous times, Chiquita affirmatively continued to pay the
124
Press Release, International Rights Advocates, Eleventh Circuit Decision in
Chiquita Tort Status Litigation (July, 25, 2014), available at http://www.iradvocates.org
/press-release/chiquita/press-release-eleventh-circuit-decision-chiquita-alien-tortstatus-litigation.
125
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677–78 (2013) (Breyer,
J., concurring); see also Paul L. Hoffman, Commentary on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.: First Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 28, 31 (2013) (“Though the
Court reformulated the question presented broadly, the application of the ATS to such
so-called ‘foreign-cubed’ cases was at the heart of most of the briefing and argument.”).
126
See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 2014).
127
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189–90 (11th Cir.
2014).
128
Id. at 1192; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 6, 15.
129
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 15.
130
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting) (concluding that plaintiff’s
claims sufficiently “touch and concern” the territory of the United States because they
allege the Chiquita violation international law from within the U.S. by offering
substantial assistance to a campaign of violence abroad).
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AUC. In March 2000, the payments were directly brought to the
attention of its senior executives during a board meeting.131 In late
February 2003, outside counsel advised Chiquita to stop payments
to the AUC, and in April 2003, even the Justice Department
admonished Chiquita.132 “Defendant Chiquita continued to pay
the AUC even after one of its directors acknowledged in an internal
email, on December 22, 2003, that, [] ‘we appear to be committing
a felony.’”133 Still the payments continued.
In Cardona, the plaintiffs did not seek to circumvent the
presumption against extraterritoriality by holding Chiquita
vicariously liable for the unauthorized actions of its subsidiaries in
Colombia. Chiquita was a direct a participant in “widespread and
systematic human rights violations with indisputable evidence of
actions taken by Chiquita in the United States.”134 If Kiobel
represents the end of the spectrum where the only connection to the
United States is mere corporate presence, Cardona falls on the
opposite end, representing substantial and repeated connections
with the United States.
The majority in Cardona mechanically applied the holding of
Kiobel and failed to advance the purposes of the presumption.135
The Eleventh Circuit proclaimed that “because our ultimate
disposition is not dependent on specificity of fact, we will only
briefly review the history of the case.”136 The majority opinion in
Kiobel did not assert that the ATS only reaches domestic conduct—
this interpretation appeared only in Justice Alito’s concurrence.137
Justice Alito’s “broader” approach was more restrictive in that it
would bar an ATS action “unless the domestic conduct is sufficient
to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s
requirements of definiteness and acceptance amongst civilized
nations.”138 It is also significant that Chiquita pled guilty to
providing support to the AUC, despite its designation as a terrorist
organization that threatens U.S. national security.139 The U.S.
131

Chiquita Sentencing Hearing, supra note 5, at 9.
Id. at 10.
133
Id.
134
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 114, at *17.
135
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 529–31.
136
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1187–88.
137
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
138
Id.; see discussion supra Part II.C; see also Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (stating that
“such an analysis is far more circumscribed than the majority opinion’s requirement”).
139
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 15.
132
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government has concluded that providing support to the AUC
directly concerns vital national interests, and violates U.S. foreign
policy and criminal law.140 Thus, Cardona undermines U.S. foreign
policy and fails to reinforce international comity.141
The dissent in Cardona reasoned that Kiobel should not be read
as “an impediment to civilians harmed by a decades-long campaign
of terror they plainly allege to have been sponsored by an American
corporation.”142 As the Second Circuit did in Balintulo, the Eleventh
Circuit did not address crucial facts in reaching its conclusion,
namely, the panel did not explain how Chiquita’s support for a
terrorist organization could violate U.S. criminal law and
undermine U.S. security, but not touch and concern the United
States.143 Not only did Chiquita aid and abet crimes against
humanity, they also interfered with the foreign policy of the United
States, actions that should satisfy the touch and concern test and
allow for ATS jurisdiction.
D. Inconsistency with International Law
“To begin with, it is a fundamental principle of international
law that every State has the sovereign authority to regulate the
conduct of its own citizens, regardless of whether that conduct
occurs inside or outside of the State’s territory.”144 The Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law explicitly says that a state may exercise
jurisdiction “with respect to the activities, interests, status, or

140

Id. at 20.
See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Chiquita Brands International
Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees
to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html (“The message to industry from this guilty plea
today is that the U.S. Government will bring its full power to bear in the investigation
of those who conduct business with designated terrorist organizations, even when
those acts occur outside of the United States.”).
142
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Jonathan Stempel,
Chiquita Wins Dismissal of U.S. Lawsuits over Colombian Abuses, REUTERS (July 24, 2014,
3:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/chiquita-colombia-decisionidUSL2N0PZ28P20140724 (“Chiquita in March 2007 pleaded guilty to a U.S. criminal
charge and paid a $25 million fine for having made payments from 1997 through
February 2004 to the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia, known in Spanish as AUC.”).
143
See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 31 C.F.R. § 594.201 (2001) (blocking transactions
with terrorists deemed to “threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States”).
144
See Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1193 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987)).
141
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relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.”145
Kiobel reaffirmed that the primary basis for the presumption against
extraterritoriality is protection against “unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord” that “should make courts particularly wary of
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
branches in managing foreign affairs.”146
By insufficiently
considering basic human rights, courts that have denied jurisdiction
under the ATS have not met the expectations of the international
community and have not recognized rights universally proclaimed
by all nations.147 Through the enactment of the ATS, the United
States consciously accepted an obligation to provide a remedy to
those injured by its own citizens under international law.
In Kiobel, the European Commission submitted an amicus brief
that claimed that the assertion of ATS jurisdiction over corporations
in its member countries violated international law.148 These same
concerns are inapplicable in Cardona, where the defendant is a U.S.
citizen. In agreement, the United States argued in their Kiobel brief
that “the court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing
any such application of the ATS,” as the United States may be
responsible under international law for the actions of U.S. citizens
abroad.149 If a corporation, incorporated and headquartered in the
United States while operating worldwide, supports from within the
territory of the United States the murder of thousands of people, it
violates international law. As the Supreme Court stated over one
hundred years ago:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor,
research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well

145

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
147
Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Our holding today . . .
is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence.”).
148
See Brief for the European Comm’n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6, 24–28, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
149
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at
15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
146
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acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.150

The Cardona court, and courts that have ruled similarly
regarding the ATS, have not met the expectations of international
comity and have declined to recognize rights universally proclaimed
by all nations.151 In doing so, these courts have declined an
opportunity to provide a substantive remedy for victims like those
in Chiquita.
E. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the ATS
Chiquita’s acts of aiding and abetting extra-judicial killings, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, which originated in the
United States, are themselves torts in violation of the law of nations.
Aiding and abetting is recognized as a valid basis for liability under
the ATS, and it is a well-established norm of international law.152
“All international authorities agree that at least purposive action . . .
constitutes aiding and abetting”; however, there is disagreement
regarding whether the mens rea required for an aiding and abetting
claim is knowledge or purpose.153 For many ATS cases, the
unresolved aiding and abetting standard could have great
implications for actions against transnational corporate defendants,
as the purpose requirement is a much higher standard than the
knowledge requirement.
Regardless of the standard, defendants in Chiquita may be held
liable under ATS as a result of the theory of aiding and abetting. It
is clear that Chiquita had knowledge that it was cooperating with a
known terrorist organization and that it repeatedly ignored its
counsel’s advice to end its relationship with the AUC. The facts
demonstrate that Chiquita acted with a purpose to violate the law
by maintaining contact with and supporting the AUC financially in
exchange for asserting dominance in the banana growing region.
F. Corporate Liability Under the ATS
The question of the possibility of ATS litigation against
corporations has attracted attention, as well as inconclusive
answers.154 The corporate accountability movement, coupled with
150

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“Our holding today . . . is a small but important step
in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”).
152
Doe I v. Nestlé, USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in
original).
153
Id. (emphasis in original).
154
Hathaway, supra note 48 (“Those celebrating the demise of the ATS may thus
find themselves surprised to discover that the end result of the Supreme Court’s
151
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reservations regarding the potential impact on the business
environment, has led to starkly divergent responses.155 The drastic
growth of transnational business and globalization has created a
safe haven for multinational corporations in both developed and
underdeveloped countries that lack appropriate regulation.156 This
section will argue that a defendant’s corporate identity should not
be dispositive in deciding whether there is jurisdiction under the
ATS. To hold otherwise would be to immunize U.S. corporate
entities operating in the developing world from “liability arising
from their facilitation of torture, destruction of property, extrajudicial killing, and environmental catastrophes.”157
One of the most prominent issues that the Supreme Court left
unanswered in Kiobel was whether the law of nations recognizes
corporate liability—whether multinational corporations can be
held civilly liable under the ATS for their actions or the actions of
their subsidiaries and agents.158 The only reference that the Supreme
Court has made toward corporate liability under the ATS is a
footnote in Sosa, where the Court directed federal courts
contemplating the recognition of new ATS claims to consider
“whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued[] if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”159
The Court did not address criminal liability, and some have
questioned whether civil liability alone is an adequate response to
“corporate participation in unimaginable crimes that deeply shock
the conscience of humanity.”160
decision yesterday may not be the end of the ATS after all, but instead a renewed focus
of ATS litigation on U.S. corporations.”).
155
See Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts from Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB125133677355
962497 (noting that litigation has proven controversial).
156
GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 146 (2013), available at http://
icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-Remediesfor-Human-Rights-Violation-by-Transnational-Business.pdf (“States are failing in their
obligation to ensure access to elective judicial remedies to victims of human rights
violations by businesses operating outside their territory.”).
157
Colin Kearney, Case Comment, International Human Rights - Corporate Liability
Claims not Actionable Under the Alien Tort Statute - Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 270 (2011).
158
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
159
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (referencing the
contrasting decisions of the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit).
160
James G. Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes:
Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 179 (2014) (arguing
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed three principles of ATS liability in
Doe I v. Nestlé.161 First, the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm: there
is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or liability.162 Second,
corporate liability under an ATS claim does not depend on the
existence of international precedent enforcing legal norms against
corporations.163 Third, norms that are “universal and absolute,” or
applicable to “all actors,” can provide the basis for an ATS claim
against a corporation.164 To determine whether a norm is universal,
courts consider, among other things, whether it is “limited to states”
and whether its application depends on the identity of the
perpetrator.165 The court concluded that three former child slaves
could assert their ATS claim against corporate defendants, as the
prohibition against slavery is universal and applies to state actors
and non-state actors alike.166
G. Human Rights Law
ATS litigation has highlighted the need for corporations to
seriously consider their involvement in any potential human rights
violations, irrespective of an ultimate finding of liability.167 In its
amicus brief in Kiobel, the European Commission argued that some
wrongs are “so repugnant that all States have a legitimate interest
and therefore have the authority to suppress and punish them.”168
It is likely that in the wake of post-Kiobel litigation, plaintiffs will
focus heavily on forum shopping depending on the facts of each
case, and will look for alternatives in transnational tort litigation.169
coupling corporate criminal liability with international crimes in national systems is
the next obvious “discovery” in corporate responsibility).
161
Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), judgment vacated, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei,
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013)).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See generally Santiago A. Cueto, Alien Tort Claims Act: A Threat to U.S. Corporation
Operating Overseas?, INT’L BUS. LAW ADVISOR (Oct. 9, 2009), http://internationalbusiness
lawadvisor.com/alien-tort-claims-act-a-threat-to-u-s-corporations-operating-overseas/.
168
See Brief for the European Comm’n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013).
169
Benjamin Hoffman & Marissa Vahlsing, Collaborative Lawyering in
Transnational Human Rights Advocacy, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 263–64 (2014):
Litigation under the [ATS] is complex, drawn-out over many years, and
results hinge on minute issues of civil procedure. In many cases, the
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Allowing U.S. defendants to be sued for human rights abuses
advances the policy of denying safe haven.170 Filartiga underscores
this importance. That case paved the way for seeking accountability
in U.S. courts by permitting suits against those defendants who
enjoy the protection of the U.S. legal system and whose egregious
behavior is therefore a legitimate U.S. concern.171 Redress for
human rights violations requires due diligence. Thus, it is not that
the state guarantees a remedy for every violation, but instead, due
diligence obligations are usually considered obligations of conduct.
Due diligence compels institutions, such as courts, to operate
prudently. “States may incur responsibility if they are not diligent in
pursuing and preventing acts contrary to international law by
prosecuting and punishing the private perpetrators.”172
Nonetheless, human rights law does not bind non-state actors;
however, corporate due diligence considerations are developing.
In this vein, John Ruggie, the United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights,
and an important contributor to international relations, developed
“Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” (the
“Ruggie Framework”).173 The Ruggie Framework has shown itself to
be influential. In September 2013, the United Kingdom became the

principal legal struggle concerns questions of international law and
federal jurisdiction—issues such as the mens rea standard for aiding and
abetting under international law or the ramifications of the difference
between corporate and natural personhood. Briefing and arguing these
questions can take years. During this time, the stories of the clients (the
merits, or facts) hardly come to light. In such instances, we have had to
explain to clients that the question at hand is no longer (or not yet) about
whether or not they have suffered the harms they claim to have suffered,
but rather about whether or not the court will agree with them that
having suffered those harms is legally significant in a U.S. court. This can
have the effect of obscuring, rather than highlighting, the wrongs for
which they seek recognition and redress.
170
Brief for Dolly Filartiga, et al. as Amici Curiae at 16, Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-2162) (“For more than 30 years, the
ATS has served a vital role in holding human rights abusers accountable and in
providing redress to victims. The Supreme Court has affirmed this role.”).
171
Id. at 16.
172
DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, ILA STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRST REPORT 11 (2014), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/
committees/study _groups.cfm/cid/1045.
173
UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, BUS. & HUMAN
RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-specialrepresentative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-frameworkand-guiding-principles (last accessed Dec. 20, 2015).
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first country to launch its implementation plan, which guides
companies on integrating human rights into their operations.174
The action plan demonstrates “important leadership in relation to
the protection of human rights defenders working on issues of
corporation accountability.”175 Most notably, the action plan is
intended to apply to U.K. companies operating both at home and
extraterritorially.176 Further, amendments to the U.K. Companies
Act has clarified that company directors will include human rights
issues in their annual reports.177
V. CONCLUSION
Cardona reflects a narrow interpretation of the standard set by
the Supreme Court in Kiobel, in light of the major distinctions
between the two cases. In an effort to strengthen international and
multinational corporate accountability, the United States and the
Supreme Court should not allow the growing power of
multinational corporations to hinder the development of a standard
and framework that can properly regulate the conduct of citizens,
whether individuals or corporations, on foreign soil. Cardona set a
precedent that creates burdensome obstacles in the path of victims
seeking remedy for abusive corporate actions abroad.178
Courts should not apply Kiobel narrowly. To apply an
ambiguous and unsettled standard so restrictively is imprudent. The
174
Press Release, United Kingdom, UK First to Launch Action Plan on Business and
Human Rights (Sept. 4, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukfirst-to-launch-action-plan-on-business-and-human-rights.
175
Michael Ineichen, UK Shows Welcome Leadership on Human Rights Defenders and
Corporate Accountability, INT’L SERV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.ishr.ch/news/uk-shows-welcome-leadership-human-rights-defendersand-corporate-accountability.
176
Id.
177
JOHN RUGGIE, JOHN RUGGIE AND SHIFT COMMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING
COUNCIL’S EXPOSURE DRAFT: GUIDANCE ON THE STRATEGIC REPORT 1 (2013), available at ht
tp://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/John%20Ruggie%20and%20Shift%20Comme
nts%20to%20FRC%20Exposure%20Draft%202013%2011%2015.pdf (last accessed
Dec. 20, 2015).
178
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015) (denying petition
of writ of certiorari); see also Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Rejects Colombian Human
Rights Suit, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015
/04/20/us-usa-court-rights-idUSKBN0NB1I520150420; Valentina Stackl, Supreme
Court Allows U.S. Corporation to Finance Terrorism Without Accountability, EARTHRIGHTS
INT’L (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.earthrights.org/media/supreme-court-allows-uscorporation-finance-terrorism-without- accountability (“By declining to hear the case,
the Supreme Court has created yet another obstacle in the path of victims seeking
remedies for abusive corporate actions abroad, and allows a US corporation to get away
with financing terrorism without accountability to its victims in US courts.”).
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Eleventh Circuit’s declination to address the allegations that the
relevant illegal behavior took place inside the United States—when
determining if the conduct touched and concerned the United States
sufficiently to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality—
is in conflict with both Kiobel and with other circuit courts.

